Despite Boxer being one of South Africa’s leading food retailers, many employees experience exploitation and unequal treatment, the union Saccawu says. Picture: (Supplied)
Story audio is generated using AI
The South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union (Saccawu) has criticised JSE-listed retailer Boxer for what it described as the unfair treatment of its workforce.
Saccawu deputy general-secretary Jerrie Mmoneri called on the Pick n Pay group-owned retailer, which has a market capitalisation of about R33bn, to provide safe and reliable transport for employees required to work late-night and early-morning shifts, and to pay employees for overtime worked, among other demands.
Business Day reported in July that Boxer was on track to deliver its ambitious store expansion strategy, with the discount retailer opening 19 new stores during the first 20 weeks in the second half of its 2026 financial year.
The retailer, spun off from Pick n Pay in 2024, saw its turnover for the 20 weeks ended July 19 grow 7.2%, slowing from the 10.9% growth reported in the second half of its 2025 financial year. Boxer has grown by more than 15% since listing on the JSE, taking its market capitalisation to just more than R33bn, more than double the value of parent company Pick n Pay, which is now valued at R13bn.
“It is unacceptable that workers who play a vital role in the company’s success continue to be denied basic rights, fair working conditions and equal employment benefits,” Mmoneri said.
“We call on Boxer to provide reliable transport from the workplace directly to employees’ homes for all qualifying shifts. We are equally disturbed by reports that employees are instructed to clock out at the end of their scheduled shifts and then return to continue working without pay,” said Mmoneri.
“If proven, this practice amounts to unpaid labour and is a serious violation of workers’ rights and South African labour legislation. Every employee deserves to be paid for every hour worked.”
Mmoneri said for more than a decade flexitimers — part-time employees working flexible shifts, such as till packers and cashiers — “continue to be excluded from benefits enjoyed by permanent employees. While they receive funeral benefits, they are denied access to performance bonuses, provident fund membership and meaningful medical aid benefits”.
“This injustice has devastating long-term consequences. Many employees retire after decades of loyal service with no retirement savings, leaving them financially vulnerable. This stands in stark contrast to workers in comparable retailers who are able to retire with meaningful retirement benefits after years of service.”
Saccawu’s demands include the immediate provision of safe and reliable transport for employees working late-night and early-morning shifts, an end to all forms of unpaid work, and the extension of provident fund, medical aid and performance bonus benefits to flexitimers.
The Cosatu affiliate called on Boxer management to engage in what it said were “meaningful negotiations” to resolve the issues.
Boxer has been approached for comment, which will be added once received.
Marikana exposed the fault lines between labour, power and profit, leaving families to bear the deepest costs
Fourteen years after the tragedy at Lonmin’s platinum mine in Marikana, the 16 August 2012 massacre remains a significant event in South Africa’s democratic history.
The state’s killing of 34 striking miners was more than just a failure in policing; it highlighted a serious crisis in the country’s political economy. Marikana revealed the weaknesses in South Africa’s post-1994 class compromise and underscored the fragility of its institutions.
State-corporate collusion and capital extraction
South Africa’s post-apartheid capitalist system relies on cheap black labour, historically supported by migrant labour systems.
At Marikana, Lonmin operated within this framework, prioritising profits and shareholder dividends over worker safety and fair wages. When miners organised an independent strike to demand a living wage, the state deployed the police service, not to mediate but to protect corporate interests and economic stability. The situation illustrates how the state functions as an arm of patriarchal-capitalist power, enforcing compliance through violence rather than democratic negotiation.
South Africa’s industrial relations were meant to balance capital growth with social fairness, aiming for shared prosperity in a growing economy. Marikana exposed this as a false promise. The political economy of the platinum belt depends on cheap, racialised migrant labour, low corporate tax contributions and aggressive profit-shifting by multinational companies. Firms like Lonmin amassed significant wealth while leaving workers in poor, informal settlements lacking basic sanitation and infrastructure.
It is essential to recognise that the R12 500 demand was not just a dispute over wages. It highlighted the organisation of migrant labour and the burden of sustaining workers that fell elsewhere.
Migrant labour systems depend on workers whose families remain in rural areas. These communities bear the domestic responsibilities needed to support workers’ lives away from the mine. The demand questioned whether the pay at the mine was enough to support the life it was meant to sustain.
The industrial relations system failed to address the inequalities because its focus shifted to maintaining stability for investors rather than redistributing economic power. Marikana demonstrated that capital and labour cannot negotiate shared prosperity peacefully while the economy remains rooted in colonial-era extraction.
The structure of South Africa’s labour relations, established under the Labour Relations Act, aimed to control class struggle through regulated collective bargaining. It relied on a supposed harmony among the state, organised businesses and formal labour.
However, Marikana indicated a serious decline in the system.
Crisis of representation and bureaucratic unionism
The rock drill operators’ strike began outside the usual bureaucratic collective bargaining channels. It disregarded a comfortable corporatism where major trade unions became disconnected from workers’ concerns. When miners demanded a
living wage of R12 500, they challenged not only Lonmin’s profits but also the legitimacy of a rigid bargaining system.
Their disconnection stemmed from a crisis of representation. The National Union of Mineworkers’ (NUM) position in Cosatu and the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance created tension between representing workers in conflict with capital, which the state protected and operating within a political alliance tied to the state. The rise of independent worker committees revealed a lack of meaningful representation. Also, the state’s use of deadly force indicated what could happen when institutional methods failed to suppress class resistance.
For nearly 20 years after 1994, South Africa celebrated the strength of labour because of its partnership with the governing ANC. Marikana violently shattered the belief, showing that the working class’s nominal power was constrained by its integration into state processes.
The traditional labour movement became ideologically divided, torn between loyalty to a liberation movement that became a governing party and the harsh realities of worker exploitation.
When workers took real action by organising outside established structures, they quickly found that state power was used to protect capital against labour struggles. Labour power proved conditional, permitted only within state-approved channels but met with violence when it threatened the status quo.
As the strike gained momentum beyond established bargaining structures, the miners were gradually depicted not as workers uniting for a labour issue but as a threat to public order and capital.
The night before the massacre, the then-minister of mineral resources, in discussing the situation with then Lonmin non-executive director Cyril Ramaphosa, asserted that it was “not a labour dispute but a criminal act”. The label had significant consequences.
Once the miners’ actions were framed as criminal rather than labour claims, their demands could be minimised by “concerns” over disorder. The shift meant that their form of organisation was not viewed through a lens of negotiation but through the need for containment. This led to one of the deadliest uses of force by the police since the Sharpeville massacre.
The aftermath: Widows and female dependants faced the immediate shock of the Marikana massacre, wrestling with bureaucratic hurdles for compensation while managing unpaid care work amid profound poverty. Photos: Paul Botes/File
The impact on widows and female dependants
South Africa’s capitalist-patriarchal system shifts the costs of industrial extraction onto women. While miners were the immediate targets of state-corporate violence, the structural shockwaves revealed the vulnerabilities faced by women as mothers, wives and primary caregivers. In a migrant labour economy, families are often separated, with women taking on all domestic and caregiving responsibilities in rural areas while men work in the mines.
When breadwinners were killed or imprisoned on 16 August 2012, the fragile division of labour crumbled. Widows suffered immediate financial loss, losing support and having to navigate patriarchal customs and bureaucratic obstacles to claim compensation or maintain their housing.
Additionally, the trauma of Marikana showed how public violence seeps into private life. Grieving women became the unseen bearers of grief, poverty and community instability, performing significant emotional and physical labour without adequate support from the state.
Viewing Marikana through a feminist lens reframes the massacre as not just a labour issue but as a violent expression of a system that exploits male labour while obscuring the
vital contributions and vulnerabilities of women.
Beyond the workplaces, the violence from Marikana affected families. This revealed how closely mining production connected to the maintenance of households and communities, which were often geographically distant from the mines. The massacre exposed the social relationships that mining depended on but that workplaces often ignored.
It also devastated rural households reliant on miners’ remittances, highlighting the deep economic vulnerabilities faced by the Marikana widows. Without income, the women encountered neglect from corporations and indifference from the state, struggling for basic reparations.
The massacre dismantled the economic and social security of families of miners, intensifying patriarchal power dynamics. In households centred on male migrant earnings, the loss or arrest of breadwinners triggered significant financial collapse.
Widows and female dependants faced the immediate shock, wrestling with bureaucratic hurdles for compensation while managing unpaid care work amid profound poverty.
Patriarchal structures in traditional communities and state systems often complicated women’s access to land, housing and financial support, exacerbating their marginalisation.
Moreover, the breakdown of the Tripartite Alliance, especially the collusion between the ruling party, capital and the NUM, showed how vulnerable democratic labour institutions can be.
Workers seeking representation outside established hierarchies faced brutal repression, signalling that institutional labour systems often prioritise control over dissent rather than protecting workers.
Marikana serves as a sharp critique of bureaucratic unionism, illustrating how institutional labour groups became disconnected from workers and overly influenced by state-capital partnerships.
To progress in today’s class struggle, labour must reflect on itself, dismantle top-down hierarchies, eliminate political favouritism and foster genuine grassroots solidarity.
Only by returning to worker-led organising can the working class reclaim its power, challenge modern capitalism’s structural imbalances and ensure that collective bargaining genuinely reflects workers’ interests rather than serving to uphold corporate and political authority.
Unfulfilled promise of democracy and national trauma
The psychological toll stretched beyond individual families, leaving lasting trauma in the wider community and South Africa as a whole. It underlined that for the black working class, the transition to democracy has left issues of personal safety and economic security unfulfilled.
Fourteen years later, Marikana stands as a stark reminder that without significant changes in
economic ownership and class power, the promise of liberation remains incomplete.
Ultimately, Marikana demonstrated that South Africa’s move towards democracy left its capitalist foundations intact. The massacre exposed how corporate-state collusion exploits human lives to sustain an unequal economy, shifting the burden of production onto the domestic and emotional labour of bereaved families.
We must continue to honour the tragic loss of the 34 miners at Marikana, stand with their families and advocate for justice, dignity and the fair advancement of workers’ rights without state violence or corporate oppression.
Sinazo Kunene is a master of arts graduate in anthropology in the department of sociology and anthropology at Nelson Mandela University. Lubabalo Cengani is a master of arts graduate in political studies in the department of history and politics at Nelson Mandela University
Basic Education Minister Siviwe Gwarube reveals a massive provincial breakdown of unfilled educator roles, prompting labor unions to demand immediate intervention from the National Treasury.
SOUTH AFRICA — Labor representatives are expressing severe frustration over the revelation that there are more than 27,000 vacant teaching posts across South Africa, a staggering figure that stands in stark contrast to the nation’s ongoing battle with high unemployment rates. The scale of the national teacher shortage was brought to light following a written parliamentary inquiry, exposing critical gaps in the education sector that unions warn are compromising student learning and overburdening current staff.
Provincial Breakdown of the Teacher Shortage
The alarming statistics were officially confirmed by Basic Education Minister Siviwe Gwarube in a formal written response to a question posed by the Patriotic Alliance. According to the minister, the data reflects the situation as of the end of June this year. She noted that while the landscape of public sector employment is fluid—with positions constantly being vacated and filled—the current snapshot highlights severe regional deficits.
The Eastern Cape currently bears the heaviest burden, topping the national list with over 5,000 unfilled teaching positions. KwaZulu-Natal follows closely in second place with 4,700 vacancies, while Gauteng ranks third with more than 3,900 open posts.
Labor Unions Demand Treasury Intervention
The disclosure has triggered a fierce backlash from labor organizations, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which voiced deep concern over the government’s sluggish response to the crisis. Union representatives emphasized that the persistent teacher shortage has a profoundly negative impact on both educators and learners.
In a strongly worded statement, labor leaders demanded that the National Treasury and the Department of Basic Education stop hiding behind “oblivious behavior.” They argued that ignoring these shortages directly leads to overloaded teachers, unmanageable and inflated class sizes, and a compromised quality of education for students nationwide.
The Controversy Over Frozen Educational Posts
Adding fuel to the controversy, the ministerial reply also indicated that as of June 30, thousands of educator posts had been officially frozen. While Minister Gwarube clarified that it should not be interpreted that every single frozen post was deliberately withheld due to strict budget constraints, the revelation did little to quell union anxieties.
Another prominent labor federation highlighted specific alarm regarding 2,700 posts that remain entirely frozen. “What are the reasons for this?” a spokesperson asked, pointing out the absurdity of leaving positions unfilled—even on a temporary basis—while qualified educators remain jobless and classrooms overflow.
In response to the mounting pressure and questions surrounding financial limitations, the Department of Basic Education has outlined its next steps. Minister Gwarube stated that she will be instructing provincial education departments to submit verified, detailed information specifically regarding any vacancies that have been deliberately frozen as a direct result of budget constraints.
As the country grapples with the dual crises of unemployment and educational resource allocation, all eyes remain on the National Treasury and provincial departments to see how swiftly these critical vacancies will be addressed.
Fractured alliances, a resurgent MK, a compromised KZN lieutenant and an unresolved Phala Phala battle leave Ramaphosa facing his weakest election foundation yet
Cyril Ramaphosa enters the November 4 municipal elections weaker than at any point since he became ANC president.
The New Dawn is dead. The alliance is fractured, Jacob Zuma’s Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Party is advancing on ANC strongholds, his lieutenant in KwaZulu-Natal has been compromised by evidence before the Madlanga Commission, and his Phala Phala impeachment battle continues.
The election numbers are more damning. The ANC won 57.5% in 2019, down from 62.15% under Zuma in 2014, then fell to about 46% in the 2021 municipal elections – its first time below 50% nationally – before collapsing to 40.18% in 2024 and losing its parliamentary majority.
It has not recovered in a single election under Ramaphosa – though without his appeal, the results would have been worse.
November will be more than a contest over municipalities. It will be a referendum on Ramaphosa’s eight years as ANC president and his promise to rescue the party from corruption, division and decline.
A poor result will not remove him from the Union Buildings. But it could destroy his authority, accelerate the battle to succeed him and leave him serving out his term as a lame-duck president.
This could be Ramaphosa’s Waterloo.
When Ramaphosa took over from Zuma in 2018, he offered moral relief after a decade of state capture. The New Dawn, Thuma Mina and renewal persuaded voters that a respectable businessman with liberation credentials could clean up the state and restore the ANC.
Ramaphosa inherited a party in decline and promised to reverse it. Eight years later, the decline has accelerated.
His presidency has not achieved nothing. His administration backed the Zondo Commission, restored institutional credibility and introduced reforms in electricity, logistics and public administration. Load-shedding has eased, and the state is more stable than under Zuma.
But elections are not decided in government reports or investor conferences. They are decided by voters who cannot find work, businesses forced to provide their water and electricity, and township families surrounded by sewage, potholes, crime and uncollected rubbish.
ANC unable to win back public trust
The New Dawn promised ethical government and renewal. Instead, commissions produce reports while politically connected officials remain in office, and municipalities adopt rescue plans while taps run dry.
Ramaphosa may have repaired parts of the state, but he has failed to restore public trust in the party controlling it.
He enters this campaign without the political machinery that supported his predecessors.
The South African Communist Party (SACP) will contest the elections independently and has been excluded from ANC campaign structures and candidate lists. The ANC has warned SACP members not to campaign against its candidates.
Cosatu is trying to hold the alliance, but loyalties inside the labour federation are divided. Some remain committed to the ANC, some sympathise with the SACP, and others have simply disengaged.
The MK Party is not simply an opposition party. It is a rival ANC – built on Zuma, liberation history and resentment of Ramaphosa’s leadership – offering disillusioned supporters a way to punish the ANC without abandoning the political tradition with which they identify.
The party destroyed the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. It is expanding into Mpumalanga, Gauteng, the Eastern Cape and Limpopo. Its elevation of Duduzane Zuma may aim to reach younger voters while preparing the movement for life beyond his father.
MK has not proved it can govern. Leadership changes, purges and dependence on the Zuma family raise questions about stability. But an angry voter does not need to believe MK will govern better – only that the ANC deserves punishment.
Mchunu is causing political damage
In KwaZulu-Natal, neither Ramaphosa nor ANC secretary-general Fikile Mbalula has matched Zuma’s emotional hold. Senzo Mchunu, who was supposed to be one of Ramaphosa’s strongest provincial lieutenants, has been compromised by allegations before the Madlanga Commission.
The commission has heard allegations of interference in policing, disbanding an investigative team and Mchunu’s relationships with controversial figures – and, this past week, that he violated protocol by sharing a confidential report.
Mchunu denies wrongdoing, and the commission has not made final findings. But the political damage is substantial. The ANC cannot deploy him across KwaZulu-Natal as the face of Ramaphosa’s clean-government project while a commission examines whether he undermined law enforcement.
Ramaphosa’s claim to ethical leadership is threatened by Phala Phala.
The public impeachment hearings over the foreign currency stolen from his farm remain suspended while the Western Cape High Court considers his bid to review and set aside the panel’s report. The Constitutional Court last week refused an opposition bid for direct access to overturn the order, though the committee can continue its work.
Ramaphosa has won time, not exoneration.
The president who promised accountability will be campaigning while trying to block the impeachment inquiry before his legal challenge is resolved.
The ANC’s response is to lean on Ramaphosa’s stature and the party’s liberation history.
Where have all the leaders gone?
But this is a municipal election. It should be fought by compelling local candidates with credible records of fixing towns and cities.
Where are the ANC’s celebrated mayors? Where are the municipal champions pointing to clean audits, reliable water, repaired roads and growing local economies?
The ANC has not made mayoral excellence the centre of its campaign, and in many municipalities it cannot campaign on a successful record. Candidate selection remains vulnerable to factional battles, and leaders are deployed to rescue unpopular local structures.
The party returns to its oldest argument: trust the ANC because it liberated you.
That appeal weakens with every election. Millions of young voters were born after apartheid. They respect liberation history but do not experience it as an answer to unemployment, unaffordable transport or a broken sewer outside the family home.
The ANC has not run out of policies. Its new manifesto will promise professional municipalities, better-qualified officials, ring-fenced revenue, infrastructure investment and action against corruption.
The ANC’s crisis is not a shortage of plans. It is the disappearance of reasons to believe the next plan will be implemented.
Ramaphosa arrived to save the ANC from Zuma. Eight years later, Zuma leads the movement taking its strongholds, the communists are campaigning separately, labour is divided, his KwaZulu-Natal lieutenant is compromised and his impeachment remains unresolved.
The New Dawn did not end in a dramatic sunset. It faded election by election.
November 4 will show whether Ramaphosa can arrest the decline – or whether this is the battlefield on which his authority inside the ANC disappears.
Economist Dawie Roodt said that teacher salaries in South Africa should be halved to double the number of teachers and demand higher performance standards.
As winter tightens its grip on East London, a heartbreaking reality continues to unfold in the city’s central business district. Men and women, driven by unemployment, poverty, and difficult life circumstances, have turned the streets into their homes. (ALAN EASON)
The Eastern Cape once again recorded the highest official unemployment rate among SA’s provinces, with the number of unemployed people rising by 147,000 in the second quarter of this year.
The province’s official unemployment rate surged to 47.5% between April and June, leaving nearly one in every two economically active people without work.
According to the latest Quarterly Labour Force Survey released on Tuesday, the rate increased by 2.9 percentage points from 44.6% in the first quarter, the steepest quarterly increase among the nine provinces.
It was also eight percentage points higher than the 39.5% recorded during the same period last year, representing the largest deterioration nationally.
The number of unemployed people in the Eastern Cape rose from 1.07-million in the first quarter of 2026 to 1.22-million in the quarter under review.
The number of unemployed people was 263,000 higher than a year ago, representing an increase of 27.5%.
Mdantsane-born Xabiso Stemele (not his real surname) knows the realities of losing a job.
He has been unemployed since January, after a company he had worked for in Cape Town for six years retrenched some of its staff.
“I had worked in that company’s human resources unit for six years.
“Those were the best years of my life as I was able to financially support my family, which now fully depends on the old age grant my grandfather receives.
“As I was starting to construct a backyard flat for myself at home, the talk of restructuring surfaced in our company, and unfortunately I was one of those who were later served with retrenchment letters.
“For the past eight months now, I have been back home as I could no longer afford to pay rent, fend for my family and survive in the big city while unemployed and looking for a job.
“It has been a humiliating situation to depend on my grandfather’s social grant.
“However, I have not given up hope that I would one day find something here in the province,” Stemele said.
The unemployment crisis remained particularly severe outside the province’s two metropolitan areas.
The official unemployment rate in the Eastern Cape’s non-metro areas rose from 53.4% to 56.5%.
The number of unemployed people increased by 105,000 to 918,000, while employment declined marginally by 1,000 to 707,000.
Buffalo City Metro’s unemployment rate increased from 28.7% to 30.5%.
Employment grew by about 7,000 to 268,000, but the number of unemployed people increased by 12,000 to 118,000.
Nelson Mandela Bay recorded a sharper increase, from 29.8% to 33.1%.
It added about 7,000 jobs, taking total employment to 371,000, but its unemployed population grew by 29,000 to 183,000.
At industry level, finance added about 18,000 jobs, while manufacturing and construction each gained about 17,000.
These gains were offset by losses of about 16,000 jobs in transport, 12,000 in trade and 5,000 each in community and social services and private households.
Compared with the second quarter of 2025, trade employment fell by about 37,000, transport by 30,000, manufacturing by 20,000 and private household employment by 18,000.
Premier Oscar Mabuyane said unemployment was one of the problems “that we still need to find a formula to solve”.
He said the province had been hit hard by challenges in the auto sector, which he described as the “backbone in the province”.
While welcoming the 13,000 jobs created during the quarter, he said the increase was too small to address the unemployment challenge.
“But with the work that we’re doing in mobilising investors, bringing people into our province, it’s exactly that issue that we need to address.
“If we can perform better as government, we will be able to create a better conducive environment for the private sector to be on board.”
Young people continued to bear the brunt of the crisis.
More than half, or 51.1%, of Eastern Cape residents aged between 15 and 34 were not in employment, education or training during the second quarter.
This represented about 1.28-million young people, an increase of 26,000 from the previous quarter and 131,000 from a year ago.
DA MPL Andrew Whitfield said the latest statistics exposed the depth of the Eastern Cape’s economic crisis.
He said the province urgently needed to get municipalities working so they could attract investment and create jobs.
“The Eastern Cape does not have a shortage of people willing to work.
“It has a shortage of jobs, investment and functioning local economies capable of creating opportunity.”
Whitfield said the figures could not be separated from the province’s outward migration crisis.
“Working towns and cities attract investment. Investment allows businesses to expand, and expanding businesses create jobs,” he said.
EFF provincial secretary Simthembile Madikizela said his party was “outraged, but not surprised” by the figures.
He said the unemployment rate “reflects the devastating consequences of decades of ANC misgovernance, economic stagnation and failure to industrialise the province”.
Black Business Forum president Luthando Bara said the loss of so many jobs should be treated as an economic emergency requiring urgent and co-ordinated action.
“These figures cannot become statistics that we simply acknowledge every quarter.
“Behind them are households that have lost incomes, young people entering the labour market with diminishing prospects, and businesses operating in communities where disposable income continues to decline.”
A KuGompo City-based recruitment agency official, who asked not to be named, said there were many unemployed people suitable for entry-level positions, but skilled candidates were harder to find.
She said there was also a shortage of companies hiring.
“I think a lot of companies are cutting costs. When one person resigns, they don’t want to hire a replacement.
“They’re just going to find people internally who they can split the work between.”
Nationally, the official unemployment rate increased from 32.7% to 33.6%.
Employment declined by 16,000, while the number of unemployed people increased by 345,000 to about 8.5-million.
Cosatu provincial chair Gura Maleki said the statistics were “highly disturbing, with the youth hardest hit”.
“Loss of jobs in the two metros have a ripple effect in the economy of surrounding towns and far-flung areas, as a result, working class communities are plunged into deeper poverty, and that is a real concern,” Maleki said.
